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One has to be proud of the privilege of 
introducing this first issue of Outlines. Critical 
Practice Studies produced in the Open Journal 
System format. 
If one regrets that the transition meant a 
reduction to only one issue in 2009, then there is 
more than enough compensation in its quality. 
Of course, the present collective of 14 editors 
representing 11 groups in 12 countries only 
emerged in 2009 and we still have to develop our 
routines. This includes ways of organizing proof-
reading, lay-out etc., and it is likely that the 
meticulously deficit-oriented reader will find 
satisfaction in many small typos and strange 
format variations for some time yet. 
But contents matter more (we hope). 
  
Although this was not produced as a special 
issue, it almost has the character of one. We 
might suggest the common title A critical 
examination of objective activity. Allow me to 
defend this interpretation as a way of reflecting o 
this collection of virtual papers. 
In our “focus and scope” description, we 
declare: 
 
The journal is interdisciplinary with a background 
and focus at the intersections of social and human 
sciences and philosophy which are established 
around the idea of practice (in its various forms: 
Praxis, activity, praxology, process theory etc.). 
This makes sense because practice, as both material 
and discursive, both form and process, both 
subjective and objective, both collective and 
individual, relays in a distinct way otherwise quite 
diverse disciplines, traditions, and positions. 
 
One important tradition that has worked on just 
this focus, and which has filled our pages, is 
cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT)1. It is 
this tradition, which is debated, overturned, 
reconstituted, superseded, developed and realized 
here - and in particular some of its core concepts 
and approaches, notably the subjectivity and 
objectivity of activity. 
While the other 3 papers explicitly take up core 
CHAT theorems and theorists for discussion, 
Rainio appears to only apply it in the special field 
of gender in play pedagogy. But, characteristic-
ally for CHAT, application requires critical 
revision. As in many recent studies inspired by 
Yrjö Engeström’s work, Vygotsky’s discussion of 
                                                
1 When referring to CHAT, I usually feel the need to 
emphasize the diversity of this tradition which the 
acronym seems to deny and some renderings ignore. This 
diversity is so obvious in this issue that this reminder is 
redundant except for those who would take a glance only 
at the editorial. For them, a footnote will suffice. 
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“double stimulation” in an experimental setting is 
profoundly reinterpreted as a general lever for 
recognizing and facilitating subjective agency: 
The constraints of a certain (socially given) 
situation are countered by a creative use of certain 
cultural artifacts, including, in this case, narrative 
and discursive forms. This “breaking away” from 
the given situation and from given habits is then 
seen, in Holzkamp’s terms – but proposing their 
revision – to be possible whether the agency 
(“action potency”) is restrictive or generalized; 
according to Rainio, this is important because 
Holzkamp ignores that in some situations, 
generalized agency just isn’t achievable.   
It is not the task of an editorial to judge the 
fairness of this critique; perhaps it can be viewed 
in the light of earlier discussions of whether a 
dichotomy of the twin concepts lies in their 
theoretical construction or in a skewed reading of 
them, or both (e.g. Haug, 2003; Nissen, 2006).  
But more to the point (that I wish to make) 
here, the backdrop of this search for subjective 
agency – with the help of a certain reading of 
Vygotsky – is the objectivity of activity. And this 
is also the case, in other ways, in Blunden’s, 
Rey’s, and Jones’ articles. 
The objectivity of the play activities that 
Rainio documents so vividly is primarily seen 
through the looking-glass of the social categories 
that structure gender inequality, as e.g. boys are 
given the more agentive roles, teachers approach 
some girls as stereotype “horse girls”, etc. The 
critical feminist agenda exoticizes this objectivity 
in a way which calls forth the impetus for 
transformation.  
In the other contributions to this issue, 
however, the critique falls, in a way, on the 
messenger: A.N. Leontiev’s development of 
Vygotsky’s psychology into a “theory of 
activity”, including its structure and the ways it 
mediates objective social requirements. It is this 
theory – along with its reception by Engeström 
and his followers – which is the target of critique 
as mechanical, functionalistic and at the same 
time utopian. 
I am not saying it shouldn’t: In so far as the 
“messenger” fails to take seriously the 
suppressive nature of these structures and 
requirements, this makes sense.  
Yet, speaking of sense, I personally do not take 
the critiques of Leontiev presented by the three 
authors to mean that his theory should be 
classified as simply objectivistic. Perhaps this is 
because I read them on the background of a more 
German-Scandinavian reception in which one of 
Leontiev’s main intentions was actually to 
recognize subjectivity as personal sense, motives, 
needs. It is this tradition which led Holzkamp to 
dedicate his founding of what he called “subject-
science” to Leontiev (Holzkamp, 1983).   
This appears to be very different from a 
roughly Anglo-Finnish reading. Blunden presents 
this latter unusually clearly, e.g. when he writes: 
 
As a result of division of labor, we have a 
separation between the goals of an individual’s 
action and the objective motive of the activity, 
which is deemed to be the meeting of some human 
(i.e., social) need. (p. 4) 
 
I have always wondered in the face of this idea 
of an objective motive, or as in the Engeströmian 
tradition, “the object-motive” of activity. I 
remember discussing this heatedly with Yrjö 
Engeström sometime in 1992, not quite knowing 
how to reconcile my respect for this great scholar 
with such an obvious misreading of his most 
important theoretical source. Did not Leontiev 
himself write clearly that  
 
If in the consciousness of the subject external 
sensitivity connects meanings with the reality of 
the objective world, then the personal sense 
connects them with the reality of his own life in 
this world, with its motives (Leontiev, 1978, 92-3) 
-  ?  
 
Was it not exactly the point of his structure of 
activity to link the objective side: action-goal-
meaning with the subjective side: activity-motive-
sense (anchored in needs), so that through 
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understanding activity one could find the 
psychological significance of any externally 
observed actions with given goals – e.g. that of 
reading a book (Leontiev A.N., 1981, 229 & 
400f.) - ? 
But of course, Engeström, Blunden and many 
others have not simply misread. Now many years 
later I have come to accept the validity of both 
readings, even though they are directly opposite, 
not least because some scholarly effort has been 
put into the matter (see e.g. Keiler, 1997, or the 
whole issue of Mind, Culture & Activity 12:1, 
2005, which is dedicated to the problem of how to 
understand the concept of the “object of 
activity”). This is not because Leontiev was 
simply hiding unreflected self-contradiction 
behind the veil of dialectics; nor is it reducible to 
the – quite considerable! – problems in translating 
key concepts such as “object” between relevant 
languages. 
In their very different ways, all three of 
Leontiev’s critics in this issue point in another 
direction: The functionalism that defines his 
standpoint, politically and theoretically. The 
subjectivity he recognized still always had to 
somehow subject to objective requirements; the 
needs that anchored motives were socially 
specified and basically always either organic or 
mere reflections of society’s demands (as “higher 
cultural needs”, see e.g. Axel & Nissen, 1993; 
Miettinen, 2005; Osterkamp, 1976).  
In Rey’s words, Leontiev stuck with a 
mechanistic view of the psyche, ignoring the 
recognition of subjectivity present in Vygotsky’s 
early and late writings, even though he sometimes 
declared the opposite: 
 
That paradoxical style, in which an underlining 
statement is contradicted some pages later, was 
characteristic of Soviet authors investigating 
certain “hot” topics of doctrinal character, as was 
the case of reflection in psychology. Leontiev flew 
in “a circle” over the same question (p. 64). 
 
One can read Rey’s main point as the proposal 
to supplement Leontiev’s objectivist psychology 
by unfolding the subjective side that Vygotsky 
could only indicate with concepts like sense or 
“perezhivanie” (emotional experience). But the 
two possible readings of Leontiev could teach us 
that this is in fact what Leontiev tried to do 
himself. Adding subjectivity does not do the job if 
functionalism prevents the understanding of its 
mediation with objectivity. The implications of 
Rey’s critique are more far-reaching. 
As Rey describes with his “circle flying” 
metaphor, and as both Blunden and Jones make 
clear, Leontiev’s functionalism was probably 
connected with the political-ideological implica-
tions of the theory. Soviet ideology broke away 
from Marx by asserting this “new society” as a 
classless domain where the universal properties of 
human activity directly described activities and 
provided an approach to their management (and 
tacitly assuming another, more real state of 
affairs). When this procedure is then transported 
to capitalism, all it seems to require is to add a 
feature of certain specific “contradictions” as a 
kind of dysfunction. It is characteristic of 
functionalism, east or west, that the subject and 
the practical, political relevance of the analysis 
itself are – perhaps conveniently – blocked from 
view. The critical thrust – like the feminism in 
Rainio’s approach to the objectivity of her girls’ 
play activities – is replaced with a descriptive or 
perhaps moralizing standpoint. Subjectivity 
becomes another object that must be added (rather 
like the little monkey on our cover image). 
Jones and Blunden both point to the 
fundamental problem in taking universal qualities 
of human activity (labor, practice, praxis etc.) as a 
utopian approach to real activities in capitalism 
(or for that matter in any other specific kind of 
society). No doubt, play pedagogy must take 
account of patriarchy, educational institutions,  
etc.; health care practice cannot be conceptualized 
without regard for welfare state, medical profes-
sionalism, etc., and in both cases, the struggles 
around privatization, New Public Management, or 
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the whole ideology of a “competitive state” acting 
on a global market etc. are probably important. Of 
course, as these examples show, “capitalism” is 
already too general and too narrow. It is no 
surprise that, 142 years after the publishing of 
Capital began, a science that reflects itself in 
cultural-historical terms breaks away from some 
of its defining generalizations. 
But the question remains how to set our 
conceptualizations of the universally human to 
work in specific circumstances. Jones concludes 
that Marx’ conception of activity was an 
 
…affirmation of the human potential for creative, 
life-affirming communion and transformation 
which had grown up inside (…) capitalist 
production (…). It was not a model of activity 
under existing conditions but a call to arms, a call
for social transformation, which was heard by the 
pioneers of the cultural-historical tradition and (…) 
is of vital significance for the development of our 
tradition today (p. 56-57). 
 
A potential and a call for social transformation. 
Does this exhaust the relevance of theorizing it? If 
so, how far does it reach? Is it in fact quite 
sufficient with the global characterization Marx 
already gave? 
Or should we indeed go on to discuss and 
develop such interdisciplinary conceptualizations 
of activity, as does Blunden, who offers the “germ 
cell” notion of “project collaboration” as 
something which “has both normative and 
descriptive force” (p. 24)? This would certainly 
be continuous with the position CHAT has 
occupied in the landscape of critical psychologies: 
Not only using psychology in social critique, nor 
just criticizing psychology (as ideology etc.), but 
offering positive theoretical conceptualizations 
alternative to ruling ideas. 
Perhaps the intersections of normative and 
descriptive forces have a wider impact than we 
often imagine. Potentials and calls for trans-
formation need not be periferal to life in capital-
ism. We could think of CHAT as continuous with 
Ernst Bloch’s (1967) emphasis on anticipation 
and hope, not just as remotely relevant in fields 
such as art or utopian politics, but as the red 
thread in all kinds of human activity, emotion and 
thinking in everyday life.  
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